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Abstract 
Collaborative consumption, which strives to increase the use of underused goods, has the 
potential to change the unsustainable trend of consumption while still benefitting consumers 
economically. Yet, the collaborative initiatives where businesses offer consumers temporary 
access to shared goods have not been theoretically examined on a general scale. We develop a 
simple model to evaluate the impact business-to-consumer sharing has on consumers. Our 
findings suggest that (i) goods are utilized more when they are shared, (ii) introducing a 
sharing market may decrease consumption of new goods, despite enabling new consumers to 
enter the market, and (iii) consumer surplus increases when the sharing price is lower than the 
ownership price. The paper also expands on the terminology around collaborative 
consumption, and highlights the differences between renting and sharing. The distinction is 
identified as a difference in the decision making, where the choice to share is made ex ante 
while decision to rent is made ex post.   
 
Keywords: collaborative consumption, peer-to-peer, sharing, renting, consumer surplus, 
business-to-consumer sharing, sustainability  
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1. Introduction 
In the last couple of years, collaborative consumption, often referred to as the “sharing 
economy”, has gained a lot of attention in both media and academic research. There are now 
multimillion-dollar companies that qualify as collaborative initiatives (examples include 
Airbnb, Lyft and Zipcar1) and a Eurobarometer poll from 2016 suggests that 52% of 
consumers in the EU are familiar with the term “collaborative economy”. 
 
One of the main issues collaborative consumption addresses is the under-utilization of durable 
assets, and overconsumption in general (Botsman and Rogers, 2010). Currently, the goods 
and services used by humans every year require the regenerative capacity of 1.6 earths 
(WWF, 2016), and changing the trend will require substantial shifts in consumer behavior 
(Moore, Cranston, Reed and Galli, 2012). A solution offered by collaborative consumption is 
services which enable consumers to access, rather than own, goods. The idea is that by 
shifting towards access-based consumption, consumers’ needs can be met without 
overexploiting the earth’s limited resources.  
 
Research suggests that economic incentives play a significant role in consumers’ decision-
making around consumption (Eckhardt, Belk, Devinney and Black, 2010; Hamari, Sjöklint 
and Ukkonen, 2016; Lamberton and Rose, 2012), and comprehending some of the key 
economic aspects is what we aim to do in this paper. In this paper, we focus on initiatives that 
promote access over ownership, and particularly on how consumers are affected when a 
sharing market is introduced next to a traditional one. Although some economic implications 
of temporary access have been studied before, the research is almost exclusively centered 
around so-called peer-to-peer markets (see e.g. Weber, 2016; Horton and Zeckhauser, 2016). 
In peer-to-peer markets, more specifically peer-to-peer renting markets, consumers rent out 
their privately owned goods to other consumers, which means that they can earn income on 
personal assets (Weber, 2016). Conversely, in a business-to-consumer market, businesses are 
always the providers of shared and rented goods, and are thus the only ones who earn 
revenues from owning. We believe the difference between a peer-to-peer market and a 
business-to-consumer market to be significant, as research on peer-to-peer networks has 
suggested that the prospect of earning money on owned assets affects consumers’ incentives 
                                                
1 Airbnb is an online platform that enables consumers to rent out their living spaces to other consumers (Zervas, 
Proserpio and Byers, 2014), Lyft is an app-based peer-to-peer ridesharing service (Feeny, 2015), and Zipcar is a 
company which provides access to cars in exchange for a membership fee (“How Does Zipcar Work, 2017). 
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and thereby the economic outcomes (Weber, 2015). Therefore, we hope to contribute to the 
field by developing a theoretical model of business-to-consumer sharing. The model is a first 
attempt to demonstrate the impact a sharing market has on consumers. 
 
The main goal of this paper is to investigate how collaborative initiatives that promote access 
over ownership impact consumers. Specifically, this study theoretically examines whether an 
introduction of a sharing market will: (i) increase the use of underused goods, (ii) decrease 
consumption of new goods and (iii) increase consumer surplus. Additionally, we expand the 
terminology around collaborative consumption and highlight the differences between renting 
and sharing.  
 
We show that when the price to share is less than the ownership price, consumers who are 
willing to share will benefit economically, since the lower price of sharing will increase 
consumer surplus. The sharing market will introduce new consumers to the market, however, 
consumption of new goods may still decrease since the goods are shared. Because of the 
innate property of sharing, shared goods will be used more. 
 
The disposition of the paper will be as follows: in section 2, collaborative consumption is 
defined, concluding with four terms to further separate different types of systems for access 
over ownership. With the new terms in mind, we delve into previous research on the subject 
in section 3, finding that there is a lack of research on business-to-consumer sharing and its 
impact on consumer surplus. Our model, which can be found in section 4, therefore attempts 
to present this kind of relationship, examining producers’ and consumers’ decisions with and 
without a sharing market. Finally, section 5 concludes and discusses areas for further 
research.  
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2. What is collaborative consumption?  
Collaborative consumption was first defined by Felson and Spaeth (1978) as consumption 
happening while in the company of others. The concept has since then been redefined and is 
now more associated with the collaborative, largely platform-based, initiatives (e.g. Airbnb) 
that have emerged in the last few years. According to Botsman and Rogers (2010), 
collaborative consumption is “a system activating untapped value of assets” (p. 24), and it 
occurs in forms of renting, lending, swapping, sharing, bartering or gifting on markets that 
appear on the side of traditional markets 
 
However, the term collaborative consumption is surrounded by uncertainty, since it lacks a 
universally agreed upon definition. Hamari, Sjökling and Ukkonen (2016) and the European 
Commission (2016) describe collaborative consumption as peer-to-peer interactions that are 
strictly happening on online platforms, thereby excluding offline as well as centralized 
markets. Weber (2016) uses the terms collaborative consumption, sharing economy and peer-
to-peer economy interchangeably to illustrate the shift from ownership to access of products. 
In an article by Belk (2014), he refers to collaborative consumption as when people 
collaborate to obtain and distribute goods for some kind of compensation, however not for 
free. 
 
In this paper, we define collaborative consumption as all initiatives that result in an increase 
in the use of underused assets and reduction of waste, similar to Botsman and Rogers (2010). 
For an in-depth explanation of the terms used as alternatives for collaborative consumption, 
see Dredge and Gyimóthy (2015).  
 
Botsman and Rogers (2010) categorize collaborative consumption into three categories: (i) 
redistribution markets, (ii) collaborative lifestyles and (iii) product service systems. The first 
category, markets for redistribution, enables unwanted goods to be sold, exchanged or given 
away for better use instead of being thrown away. The second category, collaborative 
lifestyles, provides an opportunity for exchanging and trading intangible assets such as time, 
skills and space, that are not used to their full capacity. Finally, the third category, product 
service systems, is a structure that simplifies sharing2 of assets by offering consumers 
temporary access to goods rather than ownership over them. This service enables multiple 
                                                
2 In this paper, the term sharing has a more specific meaning than just being a verb. However, in this context, it 
describes how goods are used by more than one person – regardless of whether it is “shared” or “rented”.  
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users to share the benefits of a good. The goods are underused, be it because of their idling 
capacity, diminished value after the first use, or their temporary demand (Botsman and 
Rogers, 2010). Examples include a car that sits in the garage the majority of the time, a book 
that will only be read once, or baby clothes which are only used for a short period of time. 
The service can be offered by a company or an institution, like a library, or it may be shared 
between peers, such as a local tool pool. For the systems to be successful, there is a need for a 
critical mass who believes that sharing is better than owning and who trust that the 
participants will take care of the assets (Botsman and Rogers, 2010). 
 
With Botsman and Roger’s (2010) three types of collaborative consumption in mind, we have 
decided to further separate product service systems, i.e. markets which give consumers 
temporary access to a good, into four categories. These categories depend on who owns the 
good and how the good is accessed. The owner is either a business or a consumer, and the 
good can be accessed either through renting or sharing. The four types of markets are peer-to-
peer renting, peer-to-peer sharing, business-to-consumer renting and business-to-consumer 
sharing. 
 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) renting 
In peer-to-peer renting, a consumer owns the good and rents it out to other consumers, so 
called “peers”, when they are not using it. A frequently used example of P2P renting is 
Airbnb.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Peer-to-peer renting 
Lines == symbolize ownership, arrows ® symbolize access. 
 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) sharing (shared ownership)  
Peer-to-peer sharing, or shared ownership, is when two or more consumers own the good 
together and share both access and costs between them. For example, a group of friends who 
jointly buy a toolbox.  
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Figure 2.2 Peer-to-peer sharing 
Lines == symbolize ownership, arrows ® symbolize access. 
 
Business-to-consumer (B2C) renting  
In business-to-consumer renting, a business owns the good and rents it out to consumers who 
want access. Common examples include car rental services and hotels.    
 
Figure 2.3 Business-to-consumer renting 
Lines == symbolize ownership, arrows ® symbolize access. 
 
Business-to-consumer (B2C) sharing  
Business-to-consumer sharing is similar to business-to-consumer renting in that a firm owns 
the good which it lends out to consumers. The difference between the two services is that in 
business-to-consumer renting, the decision to rent is made ex post the specific need for the 
good has occurred. For example, if a consumer needs a car at a specific date, they rent a car 
for that date. In business-to-consumer sharing, however, the decision to “rent” is made ex 
ante. Instead of renting a car for a specific date, the consumer joins a carpool where he or she 
pays a monthly fee in order to gain access to the car whenever they need it. Additional well-
known examples include libraries and bike share programs such as Citibike.  
 
Figure 2.4 Business-to-consumer sharing 
Lines == symbolize ownership, arrows ® symbolize access. 
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3. Related literature 
Most of previous research on what effect access instead of ownership has on consumers has 
focused on business-to-consumer (B2C) renting and peer-to-peer (P2P) renting. While the 
listed articles often use “sharing” instead of “renting” to describe the market interactions, the 
definitions from section 2 are used below. 
 
Regarding B2C renting, most articles have concentrated on one type of rented goods, rather 
than on the market at large. Shelton (1968) and Reiss (1972) both examine how consumers 
decide between renting and buying property, finding that the demand depend on the costs 
related to the two options as well as on the future expectations about price and rent. For rented 
software, Choudhary, Tomak and Chaturvedi (1998) claim that demand increases due to 
positive network externalities3, which in turn increases consumer surplus. Flath (1980) offers 
a more comprehensive analysis of when renting is preferred over buying, for example when 
the consumer expect to use the good infrequently, but does not discuss what effect the 
decision has on the traditional market. 
 
The effect a peer-to-peer renting market has on demand has been given plenty of attention. 
Weber (2015) argues that since there is an opportunity to earn money on the products you 
buy, demand to own a good may increase, given that it is a high-cost product. In the same 
vein, Horton and Zeckhauser (2016) suggest that, depending on rental rates and purchasing 
prices, a P2P renting market could either increase or decrease ownership. The two papers 
reflect the results made by Miller (1974) and Benjamin and Kormendi (1974) who analyzed 
the effect of a second-hand market on the price of a durable good and concluded that 
consumers increase their willingness to pay for a first-hand good.  
 
Building on Weber’s (2015) analysis, Weber (2016) showed that consumer surplus always 
will increase when there is P2P renting. Similar results have been obtained by Benjaafar, 
Kong, Li and Courcoubetis (2015) along with Horton and Zeckhauser (2016), and Fraiberger 
and Sundararajan (2015). 
 
Conversely, a study by Jiang and Tian (2016) suggests that introducing peer-to-peer renting 
alongside a monopoly market decreases consumer surplus. Jiang and Tian (2016) argue that a 
                                                
3 The more people who have the good, the more valued is it, for example a telephone (Choudhary et al., 1998) 
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P2P market incentivizes firms to improve their quality, thereby driving up prices, and that the 
raised price will improve firms’ profits and lead to a decline in consumer surplus. However, 
Jiang and Tian (2016) find that if transaction costs are low, social welfare will improve at 
large as producer surplus increases. 
 
The studies by Benjaafar et al. (2015), Horton and Zeckhauser (2016) and Fraiberger and 
Sundararajan (2015) all offer explanations as to who benefits the most from a P2P renting 
market. Benjaafar et al. (2015) argue that the largest gains are obtained by those who – in the 
absence of a renting market – are indifferent between owning and renting, and similarly 
Horton and Zeckhauser (2016) suggest that non-users who value the good almost as high as 
owners have the greatest gains in surplus. Results from both papers indicate that goods where 
the decision of whether to own depends on a consumer’s income, rather than for example 
taste or expected usage, could offer the highest gains in surplus. Fraiberger and Sundararajan 
(2015) add to this notion by explicitly suggesting that consumers with below-median incomes 
gain the most from P2P renting. 
 
When it comes to business-to-consumer (B2C) sharing, quantitative papers are less abundant. 
Although some papers have conceptualized B2C sharing qualitatively (Bardhi and Eckhardt 
2012), or explored consumer behavior surrounding it (Hwang and Griffiths 2017), little 
research has been carried out in terms of market effects. 
 
Varian (2000) and Ordover & Willig (1978) studies B2C sharing of information goods, such 
as books and films, and its effect on the traditional market. Both find that consumer surplus 
will increase with the existence of a sharing market. Varian’s (2000) main findings are that 
consumers will pay a lower price per use when there is a possibility to form a sharing club 
and that each item will be used more, thereby increasing consumer welfare. Ordover & Willig 
(1978) found in a pilot study on five economic journals that four of them could increase their 
library subscription price and lower personal subscription price to increase consumer surplus, 
while producer surplus stays the same. 
 
While the paper most resembles Varian’s (2000), his approach fails to address B2C sharing in 
a more general sense. Therefore, the paper aims to contribute to the field by developing a 
theoretical model for all kinds of B2C sharing. 
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4. Model 
Our model describes the decisions made by producers and consumers when a sharing market 
is introduced, i.e. when consumers can choose to access a good through a sharing service 
instead of owning it. The products supplied in the sharing market are homogeneous in feature 
and quality to the ones which you can own. When the option to share does not exist, 
everybody who wants to use a good must own it. First, the price setting strategy by suppliers 
in a perfect competitive market is illustrated. Second, consumer choice and demand is 
discussed. With the help of these analyses, equilibrium price and quantity with and without a 
sharing market is presented, as well as the effects in consumer surplus. 
 
4.1 Producer costs, price and supply 
Without loss of generality, the total cost to produce a good for ownership is assumed to be a 
constant cost 𝑐 for each product. Consequently, the marginal cost and price for ownership 𝑝#will be 𝑐, regardless of the existence of a sharing market, because of the nature of perfect 
competition. The quantity of owned goods 𝑄# is plainly the number of people 𝑛#	who wants 
to own the good. 𝑀𝐶)*+	,-./#).	*/01-23	4015+. = 𝑀𝐶#,2 = 𝑐 = 𝑝#	     (1) 
In a sharing market, the quantity of goods 𝑄* depends on the number of consumers 𝑛* who 
are interested in the service, divided by the number of people 𝑘 who can share one item. For 
example, if five people can share a car and 30 people want to have access, there is a need for 
six cars. 𝑘 is a discrete variable which is exogenously determined and therefore it has to be at 
least two, otherwise an item will not be shared4. This suggests that if at least two consumers 
share the good, the good will be used more than if it had been owned.  
 
Conclusion 1: When the number of consumers who can share a good is at least two, the good 
will be used more compared to if the consumers would have bought one good each. 
 
The demand for sharing in the model only determines the number of people who want to have 
access to the good, and not the quantity that will be shared. We therefore define the costs in 
terms of sharers 𝑛*.  
                                                
4 To make the concept of sharing goods more intuitive, we assume that the number of people who can share one 
item is discrete. However, in reality, it is possible for e.g. five people to share two cars, thus creating a 
continuous variable for k. 
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To provide a sharing service, the firm pays the price of the good 𝑐 and the cost for 
maintenance 𝑚, for each good 𝑄* supplied. While maintenance costs, like insurance, storage 
and reparations, could also be dependent on factors such as time and use, we assume it is 
solely a fixed cost for each good. There is also a membership cost 𝛿 which is paid per person 𝑛* who want to access the product. This could be thought of as administrational costs, the 
more people who want to access the product, the more administration is needed. Since the 
quantity of goods supplied depend on 𝑛*	and 𝑘, we can write the total costs as: 𝑇𝐶*/01+ = (𝑐 + 𝑚)𝑄* + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑛* = (?@4)2A5 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑛*     (2) 
To determine the marginal cost, and price, of a sharing service, we take the partial derivative 
of (2) with respect to the quantity of people 𝑛*  requesting the service. The marginal cost is 
therefore the shared price and maintenance cost plus the membership cost.  𝑀𝐶*/01+ = BCDAEFGHB2A = ?@45 + 𝛿 = 𝑝*     (3) 
Comparing the results from equation (1) and (3), it is evident that the sharing price 𝑝* will be 
less than the owning price 𝑝# if the membership cost 𝛿 is lower than the difference between 
the price of the good and the shared price and maintenance cost. 𝑝* < 𝑝# ⟹ ?@45 + 𝛿 < 𝑐 ⟹ 𝛿 < 𝑐 − ?@45      (4) 
4.2 Consumer choice and demand 
A consumer can choose to either buy the good, share or do neither. The total demand for 
being able to use an item is therefore the vertically added demand for sharing and owning. If 
sharing is not an option, the demand to own a good would equal the total demand to use it, as 
we assume that all consumers who are willing to share a good would buy it if the price is 
below their willingness to pay. The opportunity of being able to share the good therefore does 
not introduce new people to the market.  
 
The usage demand is determined by the individual’s utility, constrained by direct usage costs 
and a transaction cost. The utility 𝑢 depends on the consumer’s usage characteristics. The 
more a good is planned to be used, the more willing is the consumer to pay for it, compared to 
a consumer with the same attributes who has less use for it. If a consumer expects to 
extensively use a product, they will also be less willing to share. This assumption is supported 
by Varian’s (2000) and Flath’s (1980) analysis of individuals’ decisions to own or rent. 
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The direct cost of usage depends on whether the product is owned or shared. The ownership 
cost is the sum of the price to own the good 𝑐 and maintenance costs 𝑚. These maintenance 
costs 𝑚, as well as the ownership price 𝑐, are split among 𝑘 people who can share the good. 
As discussed above, the price for a shared good also includes a membership cost 𝛿 which is 
paid per person. Given that individuals otherwise have the same characteristics, people will 
choose to share if the cost of sharing is lower than the cost of owning. The opposite is true if 
consumers decide to own. With the existing cost constrains, the condition of when to share is:  ?@45 + 𝛿 < 𝑐 +𝑚      (5) 
Three conclusions can be drawn from (5) about the conditions for preferring to share under 
the given cost constraints. Consumers will share if (i) the maintenance cost is higher than the 
difference between the sharing price and owning price, (ii) the owning price is higher than the 
difference between the sharing price and maintenance cost and (iii) the membership cost is 
less than the difference between ownership cost and shared price and maintenance. Rewriting 
(5) in terms of prices and maintenance costs the result is: 𝑚 > ?@45 + 𝛿 − 𝑐 ⟹ 𝑚 > 𝑝* − 𝑝#     (6) 
A consequence of (6) is that consumers prefer to share even when the price of a sharing 
service 𝑝* is higher than the price to own 𝑝#, but only if the maintenance cost is higher than 
the price difference. This stems from the fact that the cost of ownership adds the maintenance 
cost to the price, while the cost of sharing only includes the price of the sharing service. 
 
Apart from the direct costs of usage identified above, there is an additional transaction cost 𝑡 
for sharing in the form of inconvenience. For consumers who choose to own a product, this 
transaction cost is inhibitive, given that all other aspects remain unchanged. 
 
In sum, the demand to use a product will depend on the utility, price, maintenance costs and 
transaction costs, regardless of whether the good is shared or owned. Consumers are for 
example more likely to own a product if they have high utility, if the product has low 
maintenance costs and a low price. The opposite is true for sharing, which is also preferred 
when the transaction costs are low and the cost of membership is low. 𝐷)*+ 𝑢, 𝑐 + 𝑚 = 𝐷#,2 𝑢, 𝑐 + 𝑚, 𝑡 + 𝐷*/01+ 𝑢, ?@45 + 𝛿, 𝑡      (7) 
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4.3 Equilibrium in the market 
In the analysis above, the prices for owning and for sharing have been determined, along with 
the factors affecting the demand for owning and sharing. Assuming that the market clears in 
both the sharing and the owning market, the equilibrium quantity of people who want to use 
the good is where the price and demand intersect. 
 
Figure 4.1 portrays the equilibrium price and quantity without a sharing market, which means 
that everybody who wants to use a good must own it. Thus, the price to use is the same as the 
price to own c and the equilibrium quantity of owned and used items 𝑄)  is equal to the 
number of people who want to own and use it 𝑛).  
 
Figure 4.1 Equilibrium without a sharing market   
 
If a sharing market is introduced, the demand to use will be divided among consumers who 
want to share 𝐷*/01+  and the ones who want to own 𝐷#,2. The demand to use 𝐷)*+  is the 
vertically added demand of 𝐷*/01+  and 𝐷#,2. Without loss of generality, the assumption in 
Figure 4.2 is that more people want to own than share a good. It also shows that sharers have 
a willingness to pay comparable to owners, due to the homogenous nature of the goods, which 
is why the demands have the same intercept. Likewise, we assume that the membership 𝛿 is 
relatively low so that the price to share 𝑝*  is lower than the price to own 𝑝#  using (4). 
However, as was shown in (6), consumers can still choose sharing over owning – even if the 
price to share is higher.   
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Figure 4.2 Equilibrium with a sharing market  
 
Here, the total number of people who use the product is 𝑛* + 𝑛#, which is greater than 𝑛). As 
mentioned before, 𝑛* represents the total amount of sharers in the market. 𝑛@ represents the 
people who would have owned the item at price 𝑝# in absence of a sharing market, but now 
share it. From now on this group of consumers is referred as converted sharers. Therefore, the 
added number of users is 𝑛* − 𝑛@. Since the quantity of shared items depends on the number 
of consumers who can share one good, and the quantity owned is just the number of owners, 
the total quantity that the two markets supply is 2A5 + 𝑄#, compared to 𝑄) when there is no 
sharing opportunity. The total quantity supplied in the presence of a sharing market will be 
less than without one as long as the shared quantity 𝑄* = 2A5  is smaller than the previously 
owned items 𝑄@ = 𝑛@. Rewriting the statement, we get this expression: 𝑘 > 2A2Q     (8) 
Under the condition that the ratio of sharers to converted sharers is smaller than the number of 
people per shared product, the sharing market can add users, but still decrease consumption. 
Since 𝑘 must be at least two, the sharing market must at least double the amount sharers to 
converted sharers, for consumption to increase. For example, if 30 out of the 60 sharers are 
converted, then 𝑘 has to be larger than 2, i.e. every item must be shared by at least three 
consumers, in order for consumption of new goods to decrease. If each good had been shared 
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by two consumers, the quantity of new goods would have been the same as without the 
sharing market.  
 
Conclusion 2: Consumption of new products will decrease if the shared good is shared by a 
higher number of people than the ratio of total sharers to converted sharers.   
 
4.4 Consumer surplus 
Consumer surplus is a measure of welfare, and is determined by the total difference between 
consumers’ willingness to pay and what they actually pay. Without a sharing market, the 
consumer surplus from using a product is the same as the surplus generated from owning it. In 
Figure 4.3, this is represented by the shaded area above the price and below the demand 
curve. 
 
Figure 4.3 Consumer Surplus without a sharing market  
 
More generally, the consumer surplus without a sharing market 𝐶𝑆)*+ can be written as: (𝐷)*+)	𝑑𝑛 − 𝑝# ∗2TU 𝑛)	     (9) 
In the market where consumers can decide between owning and sharing a good, the total 
consumer surplus 𝐶𝑆.#.0V is obtained by adding the consumer surplus generated from owning 𝐶𝑆#,2 and the surplus generated from sharing 𝐶𝑆*/01+. Figure 4.4 illustrates the consumer 
surpluses from owning, area 𝐴𝑝#𝐵, and sharing, area 𝐴𝑝*𝐶.  
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Figure 4.4 Consumer Surplus with a sharing market  
 
The consumer surplus 𝐶𝑆#,2 generated from owning when sharing is an option is: (𝐷#,2)	𝑑𝑛 − 𝑝# ∗2YU 𝑛#	     (10) 
Similarly, the sharing surplus 𝐶𝑆*/01+ can be expressed as: (𝐷*/01+)	𝑑𝑛 − 𝑝* ∗2AU 𝑛*	     (11) 
Adding (10) and (11), the total consumer surplus with a sharing market 𝐶𝑆.#.0V is: (𝐷#,2)	𝑑𝑛 − 𝑝# ∗2YU 𝑛# + (𝐷*/01+)	𝑑𝑛 − 𝑝* ∗2AU 𝑛*      (12) 
The gain in consumer surplus when adding a sharing market to a market without sharing, is 
obtained by subtracting (9) from (12). (𝐷#,2)	𝑑𝑛 − 𝑝# ∗2YU 𝑛# + (𝐷*/01+)	𝑑𝑛 − 𝑝* ∗2AU 𝑛* −	 (𝐷)*+)	𝑑𝑛 − 𝑝# ∗2TU 𝑛)     (13) 
Which, when simplified, creates the following expression for the net surplus gain:  (𝐷*/01+)	𝑑𝑛 +	𝑝# ∗ 𝑛@ − 𝑝* ∗2A2Q 𝑛*     (14) 
The net gain is illustrated by the shaded area in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5 Net surplus gain when introducing a sharing market  
 
If the price of sharing 𝑝* is lower than the ownership price 𝑝#, introducing a sharing market 
will always increase consumer surplus. As shown by (3), the sharing price depends on the size 
of “number of sharers” 𝑘. Because the cost 𝑐 and maintenance 𝑚 for a good is divided 
between the sharers, a higher 𝑘 leads to a lower 𝑝*, and thus a larger gain in surplus. 
Additionally, there will be a surplus increase if the membership cost is lower than the 
difference between price to own and shared price and maintenance (see (4)). 
 
Conclusion 3: As long as the price of sharing 𝑝* is lower than the price to own 𝑝#, 
introducing a sharing market will always increase consumer surplus. 
 
The way in which the total demand to use 𝐷)*+ is divided between sharing and owning also 
affects the size of the surplus. If demand for sharing is low, the demand curve	𝐷*/01+ is steep, 
and the steeper the demand curve the smaller the surplus gain. Equally, the higher the 
demand, the flatter the slope and the larger the increase in surplus.  
 
The only scenario where consumer surplus may decrease with a sharing market is when the 
price for sharing is higher than the price to own. As was demonstrated in (6), consumers still 
choose to share even if the price is higher, due to a large maintenance cost. The net loss in 
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consumer surplus is shown by the shaded area in Figure 4.6. Again, the magnitude of the loss 
depends on the slope of the demand curve for sharing along with factors affecting the price. 
 
Figure 4.6 Net surplus loss when introducing a sharing market  
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5. Conclusion 
This paper set out to theoretically study collaborative initiatives which give consumers 
temporary access to goods and its impact on consumers. More specifically, the paper 
examines whether business-to-consumer sharing succeeds in increasing the use of underused 
assets and decreasing consumption, as well as what effect an introduction of a sharing market 
has on consumer surplus. 
 
In order to fulfill the purpose of the paper, a simple theoretical model was developed. The 
model resulted in three main findings. Firstly, the use of a shared good will increase, when the 
number of consumers who can share one good is at least two. Secondly, consumption of new 
goods will decrease if the number of people who share each good is higher than the ratio 
between total sharers and “converted sharers”. Lastly, consumer surplus will increase when 
the price to share is lower than the price to own. 
 
Our findings suggest that business-to-consumer sharing creates economic benefits for 
consumers who are willing to participate in a sharing market, as long as the price to share is 
lower than the price to own. Consumers who choose to own goods will not experience 
changes in benefits when a sharing market is introduced. When the price to share is lower, the 
sharing market will serve a new cohort of consumers who were previously unable to access 
the good because of their relatively low willingness-to-pay. However, because all “new” 
consumers will be allocated in the sharing market, consumption of new goods will not 
necessarily increase. Instead, the introduction of a sharing market will decrease overall 
consumption if the ratio of total sharers to converted sharers does not exceed the amount of 
people who can share one item.  
 
A second key part of this paper was the development of a more definite terminology for 
services providing access to consumers. During the process of researching relevant literature, 
we found that essential terms often were used inconsistently and interchangeably. The 
absence of precise and consistent definitions for access over ownership markets made it 
challenging to compare and contrast the works of different scholars.  
 
The distinction between sharing and renting was identified as a difference in the decision 
making, where the choice to share is made ex ante while decision to rent is made ex post. 
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Another important factor in defining the services was whether the good was owned by a 
business or a consumer. Four categories were created; peer-to-peer renting, peer-to-peer 
sharing, business-to-consumer renting and business-to-consumer sharing. In our opinion, 
agreeing on mutual and precise definitions is necessary in order to advance research of 
collaborative consumption. Future studies should be attentive in this regard.  
 
Due to the lack of academic work on business-to-consumer sharing, the area could prove 
fruitful for further research. The model presented in this paper was a first attempt to illustrate 
the effect a sharing market has on consumers, and it could usefully be expanded and made 
more complex to make more robust conclusions. Further research may explore different 
market structures, such as a monopoly, and the sharing market’s effect on decisions and 
surpluses from producers’ point of view. By developing a theoretical model of producer and 
consumer surplus, conclusions could be drawn regarding overall social welfare, as well as 
potential deadweight loss. Another interesting implication could be to include certain 
differences between shared and owned goods in the model, for example by having a 
maintenance cost dependent on time or use. It would also be interesting to gather empirical 
material and compare it to our theoretical framework. 
 
Collaborative consumption provides an alternative way of consuming, and what it has to offer 
may very well be a step towards sustainability. This paper implied that an introduction of a 
sharing market has the potential to achieve what it sets out to do, namely decrease 
consumption and increase the use of underused goods. Business-to-consumer sharing will 
particularly benefit consumers who are willing to participate in the sharing market, but only 
when the price of the sharing service is less than the price to own.   
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